Investment in renewable power ($1.19 trillion) slightly exceeds fossil fuel investment ($ 1.13 trillion) for the first time – A narrow but symbolically important gap.

In 2024, a threshold was crossed that energy-transition advocates have chased for more than a decade: global capital flowing into the core electricity-transition stack—renewable power generation, power grids, and battery storage—edged ahead of investment in fossil fuels. Though the gap is narrow, it is symbolically important, showing that the system-building side of decarbonisation (generation + networks + flexibility) is now competing head-to-head with the fossil value chain for investors’ balance sheets. 

Yet the headline should not be read as a clean victory for the transition. It is better understood as a “tipping point with caveats”: the world is investing heavily in clean supply, but still financing fossil supply at scale—and, crucially, still struggling to finance the enabling infrastructure fast enough and broadly enough across emerging markets to convert clean investment into reliable, affordable power and durable green growth.

Solar PV hit USD 554 billion, up 49% versus the 2022/2023 average, and represented 69% of renewable investment in 2024 – becoming the fastest route to “new electrons per dollar,” particularly when paired with storage. By contrast, investment in “other renewables” declined sharply. This indicates a concentration of capital into scalable, modular assets—especially solar—while more complex technologies face risk premia (construction risk, permitting, long tenors, grid integration complexity). A solar-heavy buildout potentially increases the system value of flexibility, transmission, and demand-side management. Without that, solar’s marginal value can fall quickly due to curtailment and congestion, turning a capital boom into a system-integration bottleneck.

What these numbers do—and do not—capture

They are “investment” figures, not subsidy totals. In the underlying tracking approach, renewable investment is typically counted at the point projects reach commitment/financial close—when funds are legally obligated—rather than when assets are commissioned. This is a capital-flow lens (capex commitments), not a fiscal-support lens. 

They do not “include” subsidies as a separate line item, but subsidies shape them in two ways:

Fossil fuel investment: why it is still rising:

Fossil fuel investment grew modestly in 2024 (about +3%), continuing an upward trend since 2020 low and approaching pre-pandemic levels. One driver highlighted is Europe’s post-Ukraine conflict effort to secure alternative oil and gas supplies—an energy security response that temporarily strengthens the investment case for LNG, upstream, and related infrastructure.

This is the transition’s “dual mandate” reality: decarbonization is competing with security and affordability, and in many jurisdictions the political economy still rewards near-term price stability more than long-term climate alignment. That is why subsidy reform remains so central: consumption subsidies distort markets and can slow efficiency and low-carbon substitution, while production-support can lock in new fossil supply.